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Abstract 
Decentralized resource allocation is a key prob­
lem for large-scale autonomic (or self-managing) 
computing systems. Motivated by a data center 
scenario, we explore efficient techniques for re­
solving resource conflicts via cooperative nego­
tiation. Rather than computing in advance the 
functional dependence of each element's utility 
upon the amount of resource it receives, which 
could be prohibitively expensive, each element's 
utility is elicited incrementally. Such incremen­
tal utility elicitation strategies require the evalu­
ation of only a small set of sampled utility func­
tion points, yet they find near-optimal allocations 
with respect to a minimax regret criterion. We 
describe preliminary computational experiments 
that illustrate the benefit of our approach. 
1 Introduction 
The long-term goal of autonomic computing is to develop 
systems that can manage themselves with little or no human 
intervention [7]. Such systems must possess the ability to 
configure themselves, monitor performance and adapt to 
changing circumstances, self-optimize, and diagnose and 
repair problems. In large, distributed computing systems, 
such autonomy will generally require the continuous allo­
cation and re-allocation of resources (e.g., compute cycles 
or storage) to distinct computing elements. As we elaborate 
below, the reasoning required to support optimal resource 
allocation is necessarily distributed, thus requiring some 
form of cooperative negotiation among the computing el­
ements that have conflicting needs for critical resources. 
To motivate our approach, we consider the task of an au­
tomated resource manager, or provisioner, allocating re­
sources to various workload managers (WMs). Each WM, 
given a specific allocation of resources, must decide how 
best to use those resources to service various client con­
tracts. As a result, the utility of a specific allocation level 
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to a WM often depends on the solution of a complex op­
timization problem. The provisioner's task is to allocate 
resources to the WMs in a way that total (organizational) 
utility is maximized. However, since the individual WM 
utility functions are complex and have no closed form­
generally, even the computation of a single utility point in 
the WM function is complex and very expensive-it is in­
feasible to communicate entire utility functions directly to 
the provisioner. 
We develop a model for distributed, cooperative negotia­
tion in which the provisioner interacts with WMs through 
a form of incremental utility elicitation. In our model, the 
provisioner asks WMs for samples of their utility function 
at certain critical allocation levels. We describe techniques 
by which the provisioner can allocate resources based on 
this partial utility information. Because distributional in­
formation over utility functions is hard to obtain, we use 
a distribution-free model, maximum regret, to measure the 
quality of such an allocation. We describe computational 
methods for computing max regret, as well as methods for 
computing (and approximating) allocations with minimal 
max (minimax) regret. We also describe several elicitation 
methods that are guaranteed to offer improvement in deci­
sion quality in the worst case, and that, in practice, improve 
worst-case decision quality very quickly. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2 we describe the resource allocation problem for 
a data center with multiple WMs, using this to motivate 
the more general model that follows. We argue that this 
problem should viewed as a form of cooperative negoti­
ation, and solved using incremental utility elicitation, in 
Section 3. In Section 4, we formalize our model, and 
present exact and approximate algorithms to compute allo­
cations with minimax regret given a set of partially known 
WM utility functions. In Section 5, we describe incremen­
tal elicitation strategies designed to reduce minimax regret, 
and present results demonstrating the effectiveness of these 
strategies in Section 6 using the data center model. We 
conclude in Section 7 with a discussion of future research 
directions. 
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2 Resource Allocation in an Autonomic 
System 
We begin by describing the class of tasks that motivates this 
research, namely, the problem of resource allocation in au­
tonomic systems. In this section, we provide a description 
of the basic task, while in Section 3 we argue that using in­
cremental utility elicitation provides an appropriate means 
to facilitate the negotiation for resources among coopera­
tive elements in an autonomic system. The formal details 
of our model will be introduced in Section 4. 
An autonomic computing system is designed to drasti­
cally reduce the role of human administrators by automat­
ing most of the managerial decision making required in 
the operation of a complex computing environment [7]. 
Automated resource allocation, in particular, is necessary 
for an autonomic system to optimize its performance and 
adapt to failures that reduce resource availability. In large, 
distributed autonomic systems, resource allocation occurs 
at multiple scopes. Local allocation decisions will be 
made within individual elements (servers, databases, stor­
age units, etc.) and small clusters of elements. Local clus­
ters will contend for pools of resources in the larger do­
main, or across administrative domains. Although elements 
in an autonomic system of a single corporation will gen­
erally be cooperative (sharing the goal of optimizing total 
business value), the complexity of local information often 
precludes centralized allocation across the entire system. 
Cooperative negotiation, using preference elicitation tech­
niques, can serve as an effective approach to decentralizing 
the problem. 
To motivate the problem, consider resource allocation 
within a data center.1 The center provides information tech­
nology resources to multiple organizations, separating do­
mains for different groups of clients. Within a domain, 
resources are managed by a workload manager, such as 
IBM's enterprise Workload Manager (eWLM) [8]. Each 
WM decides how to allocate resources in its domain to 
maintain quality of service (QoS) for each of its transac­
tion classes. The QoS specification for a transaction class 
is specified by a contract with customers, indicating mon­
etary payments or penalties as a function of the QoS pro­
vided to transactions in the class. W hile a real WM may 
require multiple resource types, we assume for simplicity, 
in this paper, that the WM uses only a single, scalar type 
of resource. Given a distribution of its client demand, a 
model that maps the demand and the resource level to QoS, 
and the contract (which maps QoS to revenue), WM i can 
compute Ui ( ai), the maximum expected revenue it could 
obtain with the allocation of resource level ai. 
Because the distribution of client demand changes over 
1 Our algorithms do not depend on the specific data center sce­
nario we study. Indeed, the algorithms are applicable to a broad 
class of cooperative distributed allocation problems. 
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Figure I: Maximum system utility as a function of allo­
cation, with total resources a = 20. Curve "Provider X' 
indicates maximum utility to A as a function of a A. Curve 
"Provider B" indicates maximum utility to B as a function 
of as. Curve "Total" indicates total utility as a function of 
a A provided to A (with a- a A provided to 8). 
time, the data center provisioner will periodically reallocate 
resources between the WMs. Letting i range over WMs, 
the resource allocation problem for the provisioner is to 
compute (where A is the set of feasible allocations, e.g., 
vectors of the form (a1, ... , an)) : 
arg max L ui(ai) 
aEA . 
(I) 
The provisioner can compute Eq. l centrally if it has a good 
model of the internal operation of each WM and can ob­
tain all relevant state information, including client demand 
distributions. In a real system, however, the model and 
data tend to be large and complex (this is certainly true in 
eWLM). Moreover, in a system with transient, heteroge­
neous components (e.g., differently configured WMs), the 
internal models of the components may simply be unavail­
able to the provisioner. 
A very natural way to approach the problem of decentral­
ized resource allocation is to have each WM determine its 
utility curve Ui, and communicate this function to the pro­
visioner. With these functions in hand, the provisioner can 
determine an optimal allocation using a suitable optimiza­
tion technique to solve Eq. l .  Since most of the information 
required to compute ui (e.g., queue arrival rates, dynamic 
QoS guarantees and pricing, etc.) is not directly available 
to the provisioner, communication of Ui curves offers the 
most expeditious way of decomposing both computation 
and communication of relevant information between the 
WMs and the provisioner. Figure l shows an example of 
the utility curves of two WMs, each with two transaction 
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classes2 The provisioner wishes to find the maximum of 
the aggregate (total utility) curve, also shown. 
3 Modeling Cooperative Negotiation as 
Utility Elicitation 
If a WM's contracts have a simple form and we have a sim­
ple QoS model (e.g., M/M/1 queue), then Ui may have a 
tractable closed form (e.g., piecewise linear or quadratic). 
However, in typical systems the dependency of service at­
tributes on resources and demand is sufficiently complex 
as to require a combination of optimization and simula­
tion to compute Ui at a single allocation point. More­
over, WMs will often have substitutable and complemen­
tary preferences over of multiple goods, giving rise to large, 
expensive-to-compute, multidimensional ui curves. Such 
complexities would make it infeasible for a WM to even 
compute its full Ui curve, let alone communicate this to the 
provisioner. 
Instead, we propose to model the resource allocation prob­
lem as cooperative negotiation. In the context of auto­
nomic computing, cooperative negotiation is not simply 
non-cooperative negotiation with the simplifying assump­
tion that agents are non-strategic. Rather, the objective is 
to achieve the right balance between global optimization 
effort, local computational expense, negotiation time, and 
decision quality. To this end, we treat the communication 
between the provisioner and the WMs as a form of utility 
elicitation. Specifically, our model allows the provisioner 
to ask each WM for its utility value for a small set of sam­
pled allocations chosen by the provisioner to contain the 
most useful information with respect to determining an ap­
proximately optimal global allocation. In this sense, our 
work can be viewed in the same spirit as work on incre­
mental utility elicitation [2, 4, 6, I 0], where the aim is to 
obtain utility information that is most useful in improving 
decision quality. However, our model is very distinct. 
Partial elicitation will generally be sufficient in negotiation 
among WMs. Given only a small number of samples of the 
utility functions ui(a;), by making simple monotonicity as­
sumptions, the provisioner can often determine the region 
of allocation space in which the optimal allocation lies.3 
For instance, having samples of the two (lower) u; curves 
in Figure I at points a; = {10, 15, 20} fori= A, B, is suf­
ficient to determine that the optimal allocation lies some-
2The QoS metric is response time. We computed the utility 
curves assuming a simple M/M/1 queue model. 
3Monotonicity of u; is a natural assumption in this domain, 
corresponding to a "free disposal" assumption. One might be 
tempted to posit that, in certain scenarios, having additional re­
sources can lead to lower expected utility (e.g., Braess's para­
dox comes to mind). However, assuming that a WM is simply 
interested in optimizing its own utility by the optimal use (or 
lack thereof) of allocated resources, the monotonicity assumption 
seems more than reasonable. 
where in the region a A E [10, 15]. 
Knowing the region in which an optimal allocation lies 
is not enough. Given partial information in the form of 
sampled utility points, the provisioner must still decide 
on a specific allocation. Generally, no allocation can be 
guaranteed optimal since, for any allocation, there exists 
some utility function consistent with the sampled points for 
which that a better allocation exists. For this reason, we 
use the minimax regret decision criterion to compute allo­
cations under utility function uncertainty [5]. This model 
bounds the error associated with the provisioner's alloca­
tion assuming an adversary picks a utility function, con­
sistent with the current sampled points, in order to make 
the allocation as unattractive as possible. We develop this 
model in Section 4, and describe algorithms for computing 
(and approximately computing) allocations with minimax 
regret. 
Minimax regret is a commonly used decision criterion in 
situations characterized by strict uncertainty [1, 5], that 
is, when uncertainty cannot be quantified probabilistically. 
Since distributional information over utility functions is 
hard to assess in the applications that currently motivate 
our model, we focus on the minimax regret criterion for 
optimization. If priors are available in a specific scenario, 
Bayesian techniques for optimization with imprecise util­
ity information and utility elicitation [ 4, 2] could be used 
as well. We defer such a treatment to future work. 
Given a specific set of sampled utility points from each 
WM, the regret associated with the minimax-optimal allo­
cation may be too high. In this case, the provisioner has the 
opportunity to ask the WMs for additional sampled util­
ity points. In Section 5, we describe elicitation strategies 
whose aim is to reduce minimax regret as quickly as pos­
sible. We describe several strategies, including a theoret­
ically motivated method that provides worst-case guaran­
tees on regret improvement, and heuristic methods that are 
more promising from a practical perspective (i.e., tend to 
get good results with far fewer queries). The reduction of 
minimax regret through incremental utility elicitation has 
been addressed previously [3, 9], though it does not appear 
to have been tackled in the context of complex cooperative 
negotiation. 
The elicitation process is incremental: the provisioner ob­
tains partial utility information from the WMs; it uses that 
information to determine a minimax-optimal allocation; 
and if this allocation has unacceptable error, the current 
utility samples are used to direct further queries. This pro­
cess can be viewed as a form of cooperative negotiation, 
overseen by the provisioner, in which each WM reveals rel­
evant information about its demands and expected revenue. 
Unlike typical economic mechanisms, the amount of rev­
elation is limited, and focused on those areas of allocation 
space that are relevant to determining an optimal allocation. 
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4 Minimax Regret 
In this section we make the model more precise, and dis­
cuss the problem of allocating resources with partial utility 
information (specifically, sampled utility curves). 
4.1 Sampled Utility Curves 
We assume a provisioner charged with the task of allocat­
ing resources to a collection of n WMs. To keep the pre­
sentation simple, we assume that the provisioner has some 
fixed amount of a single resource type to allocate. An al­
location is a vector a = (a 1, . .. , an) such that a; ;::: 0 and 
I;; a; :::; 1. Here a; refers to the fraction of the resources 
obtained by WM i. We denote by A the set of feasible allo­
cations. WM i's utility function u; : [0, 1] -> R associates 
a utility with any allocation of resources to it; specifically, 
u; ( ai) denotes the expected utility that WM i will realize 
if it is given fraction a; of the resources under the control 
of the provisioner.4 A utility vector u = (u1, ... , un) is a 
collection of such utility functions, one per WM. 
We define the value of an allocation a under utility vector 
u to be the sum of the WM utilities: 
V(a, u) = L u;(a;) 
i$n 
Notice that we make an implicit commensurability assump­
tion, allowing the addition of WM utilities. In cooperative 
settings such as ours, this is generally acceptable (since, 
say, individual WM utility might measure its contribution 
to organizational value). We use the sum of individual util­
ities to reduce notational clutter; but arbitrary nondecreas­
ing functions (transformations) can also be applied to the 
u;, and these sums taken as well, without any substantive 
impact on our techniques. 
Given a collection of utility functions u, the provisioner 
is charged with the task of determining an optimal alloca­
tion w.r.t. u: maxaEA V(a, u). In general, this is a com­
plex nonlinear optimization problem, since we make few 
assumptions about the structure of the individual u;. A 
much more difficult problem emerges however: the con­
struction of an optimal allocation requires full knowledge 
of the individual utility functions. But as mentioned above, 
even the calculation of a single utility point u;(a;) by WM 
i can be extremely difficult. Since u; will generally have 
no simple closed form, assuming full access to u; is prob­
lematic. 
This difficulty can be circumvented if the provisioner is 
permitted to construct an approximately optimal alloca­
tion based on partial utility information. We assume: (I) 
Each WM can evaluate its utility function at specific points 
4WM i will not have utility for such "fractions" explicitly, but 
rather for the amount corresponding to this share. 
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Figure 2: Bounds on the set of feasible utility functions. 
a;, but cannot provide a closed form representation of u;. 
(2) u; is monotonic non-decreasing (i.e., if a; ;::: a;, then 
u;(a;) ;::: u;(a;)), and that each WM can easily determine 
an upper bound on the fraction of resources aJ it can prof­
itably use (i.e., it can find a point aJ s.t. u;(a;) = u;(aJ) 
for all a; ;::: aJ). (3) The provisioner can query each 
WM by providing an allocation level a; and receiving in 
response u;(ai), the evaluation ofu; at the query point.5 
4.2 Minimax Regret 
We defer the question of elicitation to the next section. For 
now, we assume the provisioner has a collection of samples 
of each WM's utility function. Specifically, let 
0 0 1 k T = T; < T; < ... < T; = ai 
be a collection of k + 1 thresholds at which samples u; ( Tf) 
have been provided. We assume that the extreme utility 
values Ui(O) and ui(aJ) have been determined.6 Notice 
that this collection of samples defines a set of k bins into 
which an allocation of resources to WM i can be placed. 
Allocation a; is said to lie within bin bi if Tf-1 < ai < Tf, 
in which case it has a lower bound on its utility of u; ( Tt 1) 
and an upper bound of u; ( Tf). We use the notation [a;] to 
denote the index j of the bin in which a; lies (if a; = T/ 
lies at a threshold, we let [a;] = j). Hence, b\ai] is the bin 
in which a; lies. 
A utility function u; for WM i is feasible (w.r.t. to the 
sample evaluations) iff it is nondecreasing and is consis­
tent with the sampled points. A utility vector u is feasible 
iff each component u; is feasible. We denote by U the set 
of feasible utility vectors given a set of utility samples S 
(Swill generally be clear from context), and by U; the set 
5We assume w.l.o.g. that I;, a{ ;::: 1. If this is false, the 
provisioner has more resources that the WMs can use jointly and 
the optimization problem faced by the provisioner is trivial. 
6For notational convenience, we assume that k+ 1, the number 
of sampled points, is the same for all WMs i-this is simply to 
keep subscripting to a minimum (nothing depends on this). 
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of feasible utility functions ui for WM i. Figure 2 shows 
bounds on a WM utility function given a set of samples. 
The vertical lines indicate bin boundaries, and the horizon­
tal lines upper and lower bounds on utility. 
Given incomplete knowledge of WM utility functions in 
the form of samples, the provisioner can measure the qual­
ity of a specific allocation in terms of its maximum regret. 
This gives a bound on the worst-case error associated with 
an allocation, assuming an adversary can pick the true util­
ity vector from the feasible set U. 
Definition The maximum regret of allocation a w.r.t. allo­
cation a' is 
MR(a, a')= max V(a', u) - V(a, u) 
uEU 
The max regret of allocation a is then 
MR(a) = maxMR(a, a') 
a'EA 
An allocation a* E arg minaEA MR(a) is said to 
have minimax regret. The minimax regret level 
MMR(U) of feasible utility set U is MR(a*). 
Minimax regret offers a reasonable method for resource al­
location in the face of utility function uncertainty. It mini­
mizes the amount of utility one could sacrifice by acting in 
the face of such uncertainty. We refer to an allocation with 
minimax regret as minimax optimal. 
4.3 Computing Max Regret 
There is a single feasible utility function Ui (for each WM) 
that gives MR(a, a') (w.r.t. any competing allocation a'). 
We set the utility over the interval [T}a;]-1, ai] to the lower 
bound ui(T}a;]-1), and the interval (ai, T}"d] to the upper 
bound. All other bins b{ are set to their maximum values. 
(If ai = Tj for some j, then all utilities are set to their 
upper bounds). The utility vector u obtained by apply­
ing this to each ui gives a its least possible feasible utility. 
It also gives every other allocation maximum utility, with 
the exception of those allocations a; ::; ai that lie within 
the same bin as ai. But for any such allocation, we have 
Ui (a;) - Ui ( ai) ::; 0 by monotonicity, and this vector en­
sures this quantity is 0. Thus, u maximizes the regret of a. 
w.r. t. any other allocation a'. 
Determining max regret MR(a) thus requires searching for 
an allocation aw that maximizes V(aw, u) - V(a, u) . We 
call this allocation a witness for a. This witness can be 
computed using a mixed integer program (since u is no 
longer a "variable"). Specifically, assume two sets of vari­
ables: Ai (i :S n) is a real-valued variable denoting the 
allocation to WM i; and Bf (i ::; n, j ::; k) is a 0-1 vari­
able denoting that the allocation to i lies in bin b{. We then 
solve the MIP: 
Maximize: '<:"" Bi ui �i�n,j'5:k i i 
sub). to: 0 ::; A; ::; aT; 2::, A; ::; 1 
1 ::; Vj ::; k, L; B{ = 1, 
Vj > 1, A;/(Tf-1)- Bf � 0 (2) 
. T A 'IIJ. < k B' - � < 0 (3) ' t a'[ -rf -
Constraints (2) and (3) constrain the lower bound of ais 
bin to be T)a;]-1 and the upper bound of ajs bin to be T)"d, 
respectively. The Tj thresholds are the usual with the ex­
ception that T}a,]-1 (i.e., the lower bound of b\"'1) is re­
placed with ai. The utilities uf are defined to be the upper 
or lower bounds associated with these bins, as defined in 
the construction above. 
Once a regret-maximizing witness a w has been deter­
mined, the max regret of a is just the difference in utility of 
a w and a given the worst-case utility function for a. 
4.4 Computing Minimax Regret 
Several exact and heuristic strategies can be used to find 
an allocation with minimax regret. We describe several 
such techniques here. Key to our methods is the notion 
of a pointwise allocation. Assume a set of sampled points 
si = { Tj} for each WM i. A pointwise allocation p is any 
allocation such that Pi E Si, for all i ::; n. In other words, 
WM i is given a fraction of resources at which it has pro­
vided a utility sample. An exhaustive pointwise allocation 
(EPA) is any feasible pointwise allocation that cannot be 
extended by allocating more resources to any WM in a way 
that feasibly attains a new pointwise allocation. More pre­
cisely, p is an EPA if it is pointwise, 2::i Pi :S 1, and for all 
., [p,, ]+1 +"' 1 '/, ' Ti' 0i=fii' Pi > . 
The supporting pointwise allocation for a, SPA( a), is the 
pointwise allocation aP whose threshold values are those at 
or just below the allocation values of a. In other words, if . '+1 . T/. ::; ai < T/. , then af = Tf. For any EPA p, denote 
by E(p) the set of extensions of p, that is, the set of ex­
haustive allocations whose SPA is p. Pointwise allocations 
have a fixed utility (i.e., there is no uncertainty about their 
utility). It is not hard to see that MR(a) ::; MR(SPA(a)). 
In addition, any allocation a can be written as SPA( a)+ 8, 
where 5i � 0. We call5(a) = 2::i 5i the surplus associated 
with a. The worst case utility of a is equal to the (fixed) 
utility of SPA( a). 
We can restrict our attention to exhaustive allocations (i.e., 
where 2::i ai = 1) in the search for minimax optimal 
allocations-this is a simple consequence of monotonicity. 
Furthermore, it isn't hard to see that minimax optimal al­
locations must lie among the set of exhaustive allocations 
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whose SPA is an EPA. We will show that 
MMR(E(p)) = min MR(a) 
aEE(p) 
can be computed effectively in an iterative fashion, for any 
EPA p. As a result, since EPAs are enumerable, we can 
search through this set to find the allocation that achieves 
MMR( E(p)) for each EPA p, and be assured that the min­
imax optimal allocation is that with minimum max regret 
among this finite set of allocations. We now describe the 
computation of MMR(E(p)). 
Let p be an EPA. First assume that 2::: Pi = 1 - t5 for some 
t5 > 0. If not,then E(p) = {p}andMMR(E(p)) = 
MR(p ). We call t5 the surplus of p. Any exhaustive al­
location in E(p) has the form a = p + 6, where tl; :::': 0 
is the portion of the surplus allocated to WM i by a, and 
Li 6; = 6. 
Let a be any allocation in E(p), and let aw be a witness 
(that is, an allocation that maximizes regret for a, obtained 
by solving the MIP described above). If aw has the prop­
erty that aj" is not in the interval (p;, a;] for any i, then 
MR(a) = MR(p). Intuitively, this holds because aw must 
also be a witness for p. Thus by computing minimax regret 
for a using the MIP described above, we obtain an upper 
bound on MMR(E(p)); and if the solution of this MIP 
provides an allocation that has the property above, we are 
assured that MMR(E(p)) = MR(p). 
If this property does not hold, we can tighten this upper 
bound on MMR(E(p)) as follows. Again, let aw be the 
witness for a, and let 'Y = tS(aw) be its surplus. Let a' = 
p + 6' be any allocation in E(p). The maximum pairwise 
regret MR(a', aw) is exactly 
Thus, the regret of any a' w.r.t. to the witness aw for a is 
equal to the max regret of p w.r.t. a w less the regret con­
tributed by allocations of a w to those i where the new allo­
cation a' exceeds that of a w, but both lie in the same bin. 
Note that the regret of a' is maximized by any allocation a w 
that allots all of its surplus (less some infinitesimal amount) 
to the those WMs i where both aj" and a; lie in the same 
bin. This means that if 'Y (the surplus of aw) is (strictly) 
greater than t5 (the surplus of a'), no matter how t5 is dis­
tributed among the bins of a', we can allocate the surplus 
'Y of a w among the same bins so that 'Yi > 6;. This ensures 
that the max regret of a' is exactly that of a. If 6 :::': "(, this 
is not possible. Specifically, let m be the largest integer 
such that t5 :::': m"(. Then the allocation a' E E(aP) that 
minimizes regret w.r.t. some a w of the form above is ob­
tained by allocating 'Y (of the total 6) of the surplus to the 
m bins of a' that have the largest utility gaps (i.e., differ­
ence between their upper and lower bounds). This alloca­
tion ensures that ai cannot exceed a; in any of these bins. 
Hence the surplus 'Y associated with a' must be allocated to 
the remaining n - m lowest gapped bins. Thus we get a 
(generally tighter) upper bound on MMR(E(aP)): 
MR(p,aw)- l:{u;(T}ai]+l)- u;(T}a']): bi is among 
the m bins with largest such gaps in utility} 
This process finds the a' E E(SPA(a)) that has minimal 
max regret w.r.t. any aw' E E(SPA(aw)). Note that aw' 
may not be a true witness for a'-it simply maximizes the 
regret of a' among those allocations that have the same SPA 
as the witness a w for a. However, this process can be re­
peated with the new allocation a': we find its witness, and 
re-allocate its surplus in the same fashion. 
This process is guaranteed to converge on an allocation that 
realizes MMR(E(p)). The process terminates when ei­
ther: the witness at the current iteration has the same SPA 
as a prior witness; the surplus associated with the current 
witness exceeds the surplus of current allocation; or the 
witness and the allocation share no bins. In each such case, 
the current allocation is minimax optimal in E(p ). The 
process only continues if a and a' share at least one bin, 
and the surplus for a' is less than that of a. It can be shown 
that the max regret of the new allocation is no greater than 
that of the prior allocation. Since this procedure can con­
sider only a finite number of distinct witness points (at most 
one per EPA), it is guaranteed to converge. 
Note that upper and lower bounds on MMR(E(aP)) for 
each aP can be produced rather easily. Thus any intelligent 
search scheme can be used to search through the space of 
pointwise allocations without enumerating them explicitly 
(e.g., using a branch-and-bound procedure). Furthermore, 
with such upper and lower bounds, one can determine an 
approximately minimax-optimal allocation as well. 
We note that several other heuristic methods for generating 
minimax allocations can be used. For example, an optimal 
optimistic allocation a0 can be computed using an IP: one 
simply sets the WM utility functions to their upper bounds 
and finds the best allocation. Let cmax be the largest utility 
gap associated with sample set S: 
"+1 . cmax = max maxu; (Tf ) - u;(yf) 
t J 
Then MR(a0) ::; 2cmax for any optimistic a0• 
Rather than relying on an IP, greedy search methods can 
be used as well. One simple technique generates an EPA 
incrementally by increasing allocation of exactly one WM 
to its next threshold value. Initially, we let each WM be as­
signed zero resources. A move can be made in this search 
space by increasing one of the WM's allocation from its 
current level Tj to Tf +1 as long as the total allocation re­
mains feasible. A simple heuristic for evaluating moves is ( Hl) ( i) u; 7' ,+, -u; 7i (i.e., increase in marginal utility per unit of 
Ti -ri 
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resource). Again, since true max regret of any allocation 
can be computed readily, even when we approximate, we 
have guaranteed regret bounds. 
5 Elicitation Strategies 
We turn our attention to the question of elicitation. We as­
sume the provisioner has a collection S of sampled utility 
points from the WMs, and has computed a minimax opti­
mal allocation a( S) (or some approximation thereof). If 
the provisioner is unhappy with the regret MR(a(S), S), 
it can ask utility queries of any of the WMs to obtained 
additional sampled utility points. 
We describe two strategies, one theoretically motivated 
to perform well in the worst-case (i.e., when an adver­
sary chooses WM utility functions, hence responses to our 
queries), and one based on more practical intuitions that we 
expect to work well in practice. 
We start with an analysis of worst-case behavior. For sim­
plicity, assume that a"[ = 1 for each WM i (i.e., each WM 
can profitably use all available resources). Let u;(1) = c:;. 
After a single query to each WM, we have a single bin for 
each WM with lower bound 0 and upper bounds c:;, hence 
a utility gap of size c:;. Each query of WM i can be seen 
as dividing this original bin into smaller bins with smaller 
utility gaps. However, an adversary can choose a utility 
function that ensures regret never goes to zero. 
Proposition 1 There exists a set of WM utility functions 
u; such that with no finite number of queries can minimax 
regret be reduced below ma;e;. 
Intuitively, such a set requires that each WM utility func­
tion be arbitrarily close to a step function, that jumps from 
utility level 0 to c:; at some critical resource level. With 
certain restrictions on either the discrete allocation of re­
sources, or the first derivative of the individual u;, this 
problem can be circumvented. 
Despite the fact that regret may never reach zero, this lower 
bound on minimax regret can be achieved in a polynomial 
number of queries using a simple "halving" procedure. The 
halving procedure asks a sequence of queries of each WM 
such that each bin is divided in half. Specifically, let k = 
2m - 1 for some m; after k queries, the utility samples for 
a specific u; will consist of k + 1 bins of size k!1. After O(n2) such queries of each WM, we are assured that regret 
can be no more than the lower bound above. 
Proposition 2 The halving procedure, after no more than 
2n( n - 1) queries of each WM, results in a collection of 
utility function samples whose minimax regret is no more 
than rna; e; (where c; is the original utility gap of WM i). 
It is important to emphasize that an adversary must pick a 
very specific utility function for each WM to ensure this 
worst-case bound. In practice, the halving strategy focuses 
effort on parts of utility space that are not relevant to deter­
mining minimax optimal allocations.? 
An intuitively simple strategy that works much better in 
practice is based on the intuition that to reduce regret, we 
want to improve the information we have about the alloca­
tion currently estimated to be optimal. Specifically, we'd 
either like to show that its regret is less than currently esti­
mated (in which case we've improved our ability to make 
an good decision, by reducing minimax regret), or gain in­
formation that will help us make a better decision. Given 
a and a w, the provisioner asks each WM i for its utility 
value at points in Pi E b\ai] or p'[ E b\ai'J. If p; ::; a; 
and the response u; (p;) is greater than its lower bound, the 
max regret of a must be reduced; similarly, if p'[ :::: a'[ 
and the response u; (p'[) is less than its upper bound. In 
either case, minimax regret will be reduced. If each WM 
responds with its upper bound in the case of u;(p'[) and its 
lower bound for u; (p;), then the max regret of the current 
best allocation has not, unfortunately, been reduced. How­
ever, we note that a great deal of uncertainty in the each of 
the WM's utility functions has been removed. Specifically, 
if a WM ever responds to a query with the upper (resp., 
lower) bound on its value, then all uncertainty is removed 
from the range of utility values between the query point and 
the upper (resp., lower) threshold of the bin in which it lies. 
Because it is expensive to query both p; and p'[, in our 
experiments we chose to query either p; or p'[ according to 
the following heuristic. The heuristic value of a bin b{ is 
the sum of the scaled height and width of the bin, defined 
as tiu +liT, where tiu = (u;(-r/) - u; (-r/-1))/u; (a"[) 
and tiT = ( T/ - T/-1) /a"[. We queried the bin (allocation 
or witness) with the highest heuristic value. We also tried 
querying just the allocation bin and just the witness bin. 
We found that the former did not reduce regret quickly and 
the latter reduced regret comparably to the heuristic, except 
when the number of query points grew larger, in which case 
the heuristic performed better. 
Although an obvious choice for p'[ is exactly a'[, we found 
it did not work well in practice because a'[ was often very 
close to the low end of the bin T)aii-1. We found that 
uncertainty is reduced more quickly when we chose p'[ at 
the midpoint of the bin (and similarly for p;). 
To reduce computation time in our experiments, we com­
puted approximately optimal allocations. For each exhaus­
tive pointwise allocation we compute the max regret of a 
small number (1-3) of random extensions, and choose the 
7Indeed, we believe that a conditional variant of the halving 
strategy, where only specific bins are halved depending on the cur­
rent samples, can attain our worst-case bound with a logarithmic 
number of queries. We do not yet have a proof of this however. 
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Figure 3: Minimax regret for 3 WMs as a function of num­
ber of queries per WM for our strategy "Heuristic Split" 
and two alternative query strategies, "Random Queries" 
and "Halve All Bins." 
extension with the minimum max regret over all EPAs. The 
basic procedure we used in our experiments then consists 
of the following steps: (a) query each WM i for its utility at 
ai = 0 and ai = 1, as well as two more randomly chosen 
points; (b) determine an approximate minimax optimal al­
location a as well as its witness a w using the current utility 
samples, terminating if MR(a) is below some acceptable 
threshold; (c) otherwise, ask one query of each WM i at 
the midpoint of bin bjai"l of bin blad; and repeat with the 
increased sample set. 
6 Empirical Results 
This section describes results of our elicitation strategy 
for our data center model. We studied configurations 
with three and four WMs, each with two transaction 
classes. Client contracts specified payments as a function 
of response time. The functions were (roughly) slightly 
smoothed out step functions, with high payments for re­
sponse time below a threshold, and zero payments above 
the threshold. Given a fixed level of resource, a WM con­
trols the response time of each class through the fraction of 
available resource assigned to that class. We used a simple 
MIM/1 queue to model response time in each class. 
Our numerical implementation of the MIP computation 
of max regret utilizes the GNU Linear Programming Kit 
(GLPK) version 3.2.4. W hile GLPK solves for a regret­
maximizing witness as a continuous variable, we constrain 
all queries to lie on a discretized grid of 1 0000 points in the 
unit interval. This discretization makes it easier to compute 
an individual WM's maximal utility for a given resource 
level, and also eliminates floating-point roundoff errors in 
identifying the bin containing a given allocation. 
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Figure 4: Minimax regret for 4 WMs as a function of num­
ber of queries per WM for our strategy "Heuristic Split" 
and two alternative query strategies, "Random Queries" 
and "Halve All Bins". 
Our implementation also uses a bounding procedure to 
greatly reduce the number of MIPs computed. During the 
loop over the EPAs, we keep track of the current best wit­
ness seen so far. We can quickly compute the regret of any 
other allocation with respect to the current best witness, 
giving us a lower bound on the max regret for the alloca­
tion. If this lower bound is greater than the lowest max 
regret found so far, we know that the allocation cannot be 
the minimax regret allocation. We found that most EPAs 
can be eliminated as minimax-optimal on this basis, with­
out actually invoking the MIP computation of max regret, 
resulting in a reduction in CPU time by nearly a factor of 
100. 
Figures 3 and 4 plot sample runs illustrating typical behav­
ior of our elicitation strategy (denoted "Heuristic Split") 
for three and four WMs, respectively. For comparison pur­
poses, we also plot the (approximate) minimax regret val­
ues obtained using two less intelligent querying strategies: 
"Random Queries" generates random queries drawn from 
a uniform distribution in the unit interval, while "Halve 
All Bins" is the halving procedure discussed previously 
in Proposition 2. In both figures, the minimax regret of 
our strategy decreases rapidly with the number of queries, 
demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach. Funher­
more, our strategy achieves significantly lower minimax re­
gret values than the other strategies, for a given number of 
query points per WM. 
Plots of the data in Figures 3 and 4, using a log scale for the 
vertical axis, show a reasonably linear decrease for our al­
gorithm. This suggests that our procedure is able to reduce 
minimax regret exponentially with the number of queries. 
While the alternative algorithms will generally reach zero 
regret with a sufficient number of queries, the rate of de-
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crease is much slower than exponential. 
The minimax regret of our strategy reduced more slowly 
with four WMs than with three. This is not surprising, since 
the space of joint utility functions, and hence the total un­
certainty, grows with the number of WMs. 
Our tentative results for two, three and four WMs suggest a 
scaling of GLPK CPU time of roughly Nq, where N is the 
number of WMs and q is the number of queries per WM. 
As a consequence, we found it to be computationally pro­
hibitive to compute the minimax regret for larger (q > 15) 
number of queries with more than four WMs. With respect 
to computation time, we must emphasize, however, that our 
goal is to minimize the amount of utility information that 
each WM must provide, since determining a single utility 
point requires intensive computation on the part of a WM. 
In addition, these values w·ill generally changt: over time, 
requiring re-elicitation and re-allocation (which is one of 
the main motivations for the autonomic model). Thus we 
generally see the number of queries per WM being rather 
small. Furthermore, preliminary tests suggest we can ob­
tain more than an order of magnitude speedup with state­
of-the-art MIP solvers such as CPLEX. Finally, we expect 
that the more computationally feasible heuristic strategies 
suggested in Section 4.4 will prove to be extremely valu­
able as a means of generating queries. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
We have argued that cooperative negotiation using incre­
mental utility elicitation is required to perform resource 
allocation in a distributed autonomic system. To address 
this need, we presented algorithms for computing minimax 
regret, and two elicitation strategies: a blind bin halving 
strategy and a strategy that halves the bins of the minimax­
optimal allocation and its regret-maximizing witness. We 
empirically demonstrated, in a data center provisioning 
scenario, that the more directed strategy quickly reduces 
minimax regret. Furthermore, although we could demon­
strate a theoretical guarantee of max regret convergence for 
the blind strategy, the heuristic strategy performs much bet­
ter in practice. 
In future work we will develop faster (and possibly more 
approximate) minimax regret algorithms to enable the 
study of larger problems. We suggested a greedy strategy 
that may not compute the minimax optimum allocation but 
saves computation because it requires that max regret be 
computed only once. However, it is not acceptable to ap­
proximate the max regret computation, as then we would 
lose any known guarantee on the quality of the allocation. 
Ultimately though in the context of autonomic computing 
our focus is on the cost of elicitation, hence we need to 
better understand the tradeoff between acceptable levels of 
minimax regret and the cost of elicitation. 
We intend to expand our model to include multidimen­
sional utility for multiple resources. The concomitant in­
crease in utility space will generally result in greater utility 
uncertainty. Further algorithm developments will likely be 
necessary to achieve acceptable regret levels without an ex­
plosion in the requisite number of preference queries. 
We also plan to study elicitation strategies for Bayesian op­
timization criteria. Bayesian approaches may reduce the 
number of needed queries by providing value of informa­
tion guidance as well as tighter bounds on the value of an 
allocation (i.e., expected value of an allocation, rather than 
worst-case bounds). To use Bayesian techniques, a provi­
sioner must form a prior distribution over the WMs' util­
ity functions, which may require the provisioner to employ 
learning techniques along with models of the internal oper­
ation of WMs, as well as WM and client demand dynamics. 
Such models must be fairly minimal though because of the 
constraints imposed by decentralization. 
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